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Abstract: EU agricultural policies have often been formulated from an “orthodox approach”, without 
directly tackling the issue of markets structure that tend to lower the power and economic welfare of 
farmers. This situation reveals a need to better comprehend the long-standing dynamics and 
processes determining the structural position of farmers to find suitable strategies for pushing forward 
more sustainable food value chain models. Classical and neo-classical economic approaches to the 
problem often consider Unfair Trade Practices (UTP) as only cyclical phenomenon caused by 
temporary disequilibrium on the market. Market forces are intended to stabilise prices and to balance 
power among value chain actors. Such approaches underestimate the role played for example by 
capital accumulation in EU food systems. Alternative and more complex analytical frameworks, for 
instance the Marxist or Chayanovian perspectives, need to be developed to better understand factors 
determining the lack of power and the weak position of farmers in food value chains, including the way 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been influencing and could be impacting these aspects in 
the future. New approaches for dealing with UTP should also be developed to find innovative solutions 
being able to develop a more sustainable food system. This paper raises the crucial need of 
increasing awareness and informing policy-makers on potential new policy instruments and tools that 
could be used to address this problem of power imbalance and of inadequate governance schemes 
weakening the position of farmers in food value chains and causing or aggravating agricultural crises. 
The paper aims to outline suggestions to bring this research topic into strategic plans for future EU 
farming systems. 
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Introduction 
Following the creation of the European Economic Community, antecedent of the 
current European Union (EU), a Common Agricultural policy (CAP) was developed at 
European level mainly to increase productivity, farmers’ incomes, as well as ensuring 
food security, bringing acceptable prices for consumers and maintain population in 
rural areas. In its first phase, the CAP was designed to strongly support EU farmers 
through a set of market interventions. One of the most important mechanisms used in 
the framework of this policy was the definition of intervention prices, when market 
prices went below a certain threshold, resulting in more stable and higher selling 
prices for EU farmers. At the same time, although the initial CAP organised the 
functioning of agricultural commodity markets, it did not directly address the structural 
position of actors in food value chains. Issues of equity and value shared in the agri-
food chain are on the rise, suggesting that CAP instruments are insufficient to 
adequately tackle the economic vulnerability and survivability of farmers. In other 
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words, the application of intervention prices could not ensure that prices offered to 
farmers were situated within an “acceptable” range of values.   
Furthermore, the instruments of the initial CAP and its subsequent developments 
could not prevent an increased concentration of wholesalers, supermarkets and 
retailers (Bukeviciute, 2009). This fact strongly influenced the development of the EU 
markets, with an important inequality in the distribution of wealth among food value 
chains actors. We observe a decreasing share of added value captured by farmers. 
On the other side of the spectrum, downstream actors have gained size and power. 
The example of pork loin in France shows that in the period from 2000 to 2013, the 
proportion of added value captured by wholesalers, supermarkets and retailers has 
been on the rise. The value captured by the upper part of the chain increased from 
around 5€/kg of pork loin during that period while it remained stable for the 
slaughtering industry and farmers. This example, though, should not be automatically 
generalised to the whole agricultural sector.  
 
Graph 1. Composition of the monthly price of the pork loin in France from 2000 to 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: French Observatory on prices and margins formation of food products (2016). Based 
on FranceAgriMer, RNM, and Kantar Worldpanel.  
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Furthermore, data from the EU commission suggest that the situation shown in the 
previous example might be widespread to the whole EU agricultural sector over the 
years 1995-2005 (lack of available data from 2005 to now). 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Evolution of value-added within the EU25 food value chain between 1995 and 2005 
 
Source: European Commission (2009) 
We see in graphic 2 a progressive increment of the value share perceived by the 
downstream value chain actors, with an increase of 3 points from 1995 to 2005. On 
the other hand, the proportion of the value captured by farmers decreased by 7 
points from 1995 to 2005. This trend is a structural movement where farmers are less 
and less “powerful”. The rather weak position of farmers in food chains implies a low 
power of negotiation and the quasi-impossibility to impose prices to food traders. 
Farmers have therefore limited options to increase their incomes; they can only 
reduce their production costs or increase the productivity. 
The continuous decrease in the influence of farmers in food value chains did not stop 
after the successive reforms of the CAP. The way of supporting farmers changed of 
nature with the introduction of direct subsidies. Alongside this change, the general 
economic liberalisation and opening of markets to goods and capital since the 80s 
and 90s, respectively, has reinforced the concentration of the downstream actors of 
food value chains, leading to an increase of their bargaining power and reducing in 
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parallel farmers’ influence and incomes (Bekeviciute, 2009; Dobson, 2003). This 
situation questions more generally the resilience of food value chains.  
After the so-called “food crisis” in 2007, the EU institutions acknowledged several 
agricultural markets issues (European Commission, 2009). They developed the 
concept of Unfair Trade Practices (UTP) meaning there is an unfair distribution of the 
value produced in food value chains. Still, this concept was developed with a view to 
tackling the “fairness” of food value chains. 
Some authors address the notion of “fairness” in the literature. Rabin (1993) defined 
an action as fair if its intent is “kind” and as unfair in the opposite case (unfriendly 
transaction). According to this author, the level of kindness is directly linked to how 
equitable the distribution of value stirred by the transaction is. Psychologists see 
“fairness” as an important issue in social exchange (Cialdini, 1993) while the equity 
theory argues that a more equitable distribution of value is conducive with a greater 
level of actors’ satisfaction (Adams, 1965). Having said that, certain market situations 
suggest that the notion of “fairness” may not be that important to consider. This might 
be the case in a situation of perfect market equilibrium; even though there could be a 
very uneven distribution of value among actors, an economic equilibrium is being 
reached, corresponding to a situation where all actors get as much value as possible 
from transactions (Smith and Williams, 1990). Since this is a situation of perfect 
market equilibrium; in theory, no actors are to be accused to exert an excessive 
power over others.  
 
We argue in this discussion paper that the approach developed by the European 
Commission is not sufficient to adequately tackle this problem. The question of which 
actors are responsible, directly or indirectly for these practices, is not sufficiently 
addressed. The European Commission proposed four types of actions: (1) to tackle 
UTP, (2) increase transparency, (3) foster integration of EU markets and (4) increase 
competition through voluntary producers’ integration. These lines of action can be 
considered as important to increase “fairness” in food value chains. However, they 
have not produced significant effects in that regard thus far.  
 
This discussion paper pursues two objectives: (1) to critically review the underlying 
analytical approach driving the designing of EU agricultural policies and (2) to discuss 
the potential of alternative analytical approaches in their ability to contribute to 
agricultural policies taking more the notion of “fairness” into account. 
Frameworks to address “fairness" in food value chains 
Pareto optimality and theorems of welfare 
Since the CAP reform in 1992, EU agricultural policies are implicitly framed from a 
neo-classical economic perspective. That is because this reform and the subsequent 
ones have been driven by the imperative of reducing the so-called “market 
distortions”, that is, to minimise any interventions that may alter the “natural” market 
equilibrium and thus reduce the global economic welfare (Mahé and Roe, 1996). 
Typically, the first CAP set intervention prices modifying market equilibriums, inciting 
growers to produce more than in “normal” situation, and decreasing the consumers’ 
welfare (distortion of the demand curve, with higher prices). The first CAP was called 
into question by the EU given the induced distortion effects as well as the pressure 
exerted by both the Americans and the World Trade Organisation calling for market 
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liberalisation. CAP direct payments are considered to be much less distortive than 
market instruments (Dewre et al. 2001).  
The neo-classical paradigm relies on the notion of Pareto optimality, the general 
economic welfare and the maximisation of individuals’ utility. The concept of Pareto 
optimality, which has been extensively applied in several disciplines so far, 
corresponds to a state of resource allocation where it is not possible to ameliorate the 
situation of one individual according to his/her preferences without lowering the 
situation of any other individuals (Stiglitz, 1981).  
The emphasis on this framework leads to a lack of focus on social dimensions like 
contractual relationships, value shared among food value chain actors, power 
balance, equity and social-being. The Pareto optimum is a minimal understanding of 
efficiency and does not consider how the added value is distributed between actors 
along the spectrum from high benefits to losses. This approach overlooks the share 
of actors with low incomes compared to others. Still, the Pareto optimum approach 
does not account for the positive and negative externalities in the same way as for 
the concept of perfect market. With respect to the concept of perfect market, it was 
critiqued inter alia, the presence of not fully rational economic agents, an imperfect 
circulation of information and the occurrence of transaction costs. Welfare theorems 
build on this notion of perfect market stating that under competitive equilibrium 
markets Pareto optimum situations are being created (Boadway and Bruce, 1984). It 
must be emphasised that calling into question the notion of perfect market also 
questions the validity of the welfare theorems and the possibility to attain Pareto 
optimum situations.  
In addition, the well-known impossibility theorem of Arrow has shown, taking the 
example of elections, the impossibility of aggregating all individual preferences while 
meeting all of the following criteria: Pareto optimum, independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, universality and non-dictatorship (Kelly, 2014). This suggests that 
attaining a Pareto optimality could occur at the expense of important social aspects 
like non-dictatorship.  
Despite of these critics and the recognition of concerns on the welfare theorems and 
the Pareto optimum approach, the EU agricultural policy is still determined under the 
umbrella of the neo-classical economic paradigm. Even though some drawbacks are 
being addressed by the EU, they often act separately from the general agricultural 
policy and take the form of rather isolated measures. The latter are not to be 
understood as a “lump–sum transfer of wealth” and should thus not be considered as 
mirroring the second theorem of welfare. Even if it was so, the redistribution of wealth 
to disadvantaged groups of persons while remaining in the frame of the second 
welfare theorem would require that national authorities are perfectly informed on 
individual preferences and all possibilities of production of firms. The possible 
existence of these two necessary elements has been heavily called into question in 
the last decades.  
In a nutshell, the current framework being used by the EU, based on a neo-classical 
paradigm, is missing essential social aspects on the “fairness” of transactions. There 
is only little emphasis on the structural position of actors in food value chains and 
related implications. As already said, the setting-up of specific EU measures does not 
sufficiently address the lack of focus on social aspects for two reasons. The first is 
that they do not directly refer to the notion of “fairness”. The second is due to the 
redistribution of wealth that creates inefficiencies.  
It is necessary to consider alternative analytical approaches to address the topic of 
“fairness” in food value chains. For this reason, this discussion paper makes a brief 
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review on alternative frameworks that may be used to enrich the current approach 
taken by EU analysts and decision-makers when designing agricultural policies. 
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The peasant economy and Marxist approaches 
 The peasant economy 
The “Peasant Economy” study developed by Alexander Chayanov (1996) is one of 
the most influential ones in the current debates in the field of agroecology and 
peasantry. Chayanov considers farms as independent economic units. Although 
modern European farmers are quite different from the conception of peasants by 
Chayanov, the framework of the Peasant Economy may be used to better understand 
social factors driving farmers’ behaviour in relation to their structural characteristics 
as production unit. For instance, this framework is useful to look at the decisions 
associated with the presence of “lock-in” like investments in material. These 
investments require the materials to be sufficiently used; and non-necessary 
operations like tillage might be effectuated, increasing production costs of farmers 
and reducing their incomes in parallel. 
Chayanov considers a Peasant farm as a non-capitalist production unit, arguing that 
a traditional farm cannot be considered as a capitalist business since peasants 
generally use family workforce. Russian peasants in the XIX century are respectively 
very different actors and context compared to “modern” farmers. However, the 
dependency of current farming systems on family labour is still existing in many farms 
in the EU. This needs to be considered since it might distort some hypothesis on 
farmers’ behaviour being used by neoclassical economists. The fact that the farm’s 
workforce consists of family members might indeed break the “rule” of free mobility of 
resources which is an essential component of a so-called perfect market. Moreover, 
the interesting work by Chayanov about the integration of Peasant in the national 
market can help to identify some of the critical factors driving the position of farmers 
along agri-food value chains. Chayanov gives special attention to the ways capitalism 
is being entered into the peasant mode of production. Indeed, he criticises collective 
actions in the agri-food chain, pointing out cases of “weak” farms with “local capital” 
in front of large trade firms often integrated in the international capital market. The 
fact of the matter is that capital accumulation does not operate at the same pace at 
farm level as compared to the downstream value chain segments, leading to an 
increasing power disequilibrium among actors. 
The Peasant Economy Framework developed by Chayanov has been quite influential 
in the fields of rural sociology and agroecology. The sociologist Jan Douwe Van der 
Ploeg (2008) built the concept of “Food Empire” upon this. He showed, in the context 
of global capital firms, that the so-called “Food Empire” is driving the process of 
capitalist accumulation within food value chains and “squeezing” farmers. This 
conflictual approach to the problem of ”fairness” in agri-food value chains appears to 
be a relevant analytical framework as policy-makers need to better understand the 
logics governing the structural position and dynamics of value chains’ actors. 
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Marxist approaches 
Marxist approaches are also relevant to the study of “fairness” in agri-food value 
chains. Since the pioneering work of Karl Marx, many relevant authors have been 
working in the field of the “agrarian question”. Most of the influential authors in this 
school of thought addressed this topic, making the agrarian question one of the main 
pillars of the Historical Materialism. Marx already dealt with the topic of the peasants 
by integrating it as a functional part of the capitalist production mode. He argued that, 
in the same way as it happened with craftsmen’s organisations, peasants will 
disappear because of the development of capitalism in rural areas. Traditional and 
inefficient farms will be replaced by bigger and more capitalistic ones. 
In line with this, we should give a special attention to the work of Karl Kautsky (1966) 
who supports the idea of the doom of peasant farms under a capitalistic agriculture. 
This influenced many Marxists and politicians who thus supported the need to 
modernise peasantry systems in order to develop productive forces. Marxists like 
Bernstein affirm that peasantry does not exist as peasants’ incomes mostly depends 
on the external provision of workforce (Bernstein, 2014).  
The Marxist framework influenced several authors in developing theories on the role 
of peasants and farmers and their inclusion in markets and in the movement of global 
capital accumulation. These approaches offer very important insights to the analysis 
of agri-food value chains as well as a better understanding of the determinants and 
wherefores of “fairness” in value chains. 
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Towards an integrated approach to comprehend and tackle the “fairness” in food 
value chains 
Resilience and systemic sustainability 
Mainstream conceptual economic frameworks have been extensively criticised in the 
literature. Critics are, inter alia, the non-consideration of either positive or negative 
externalities as well as the absence of perfect equilibrium markets and of a perfect 
mobility and allocation of resources. For the purpose of this paper, the main concern 
derived from the literature is that traditional conceptual frameworks poorly address 
social aspects and particularly the question of “fairness”. The notion of “fairness” in 
food value chains partly informs the sustainability and resilience of food value chains. 
Resilience can be defined as “the ability of a social or ecological system to absorb 
disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the 
capacity of self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change” (IPCC, 
2007: 880). Most existing studies on resilience, though, measure resiliency without 
questioning the suitability of the underlying conceptual framework used. Equity in 
value chains is considered but there is a lack of understanding on the factors driving 
the “fairness” in food value chains.  
In the context of agriculture, only a few studies mentioned the concept of resilience or 
“systemic sustainability”, taking account of the way value chain actors’ are organised. 
Attributes of survival capacity (flexibility, adaptivity, robustness and responsiveness), 
i.e. the way a value chain can react and adapt to risks, uncertainties and 
disturbances, can be used to inform resiliency (Talamini and Velloso Ferreira, 2010; 
Thadakamaila et al., 2004). These attributes can be measured using indicators of 
Social Network Analysis (SNA). This is for instance what Bassenne et al. (2015) 
proposed in their pioneering work developing the notion of “systemic sustainability”. 
By the concept of systemic sustainability the authors refer to the three classical pillars 
of sustainability (economic, social and environmental) complemented by the network 
dimension. They also refer to value chain governance models, combining the 
centrality (power) and density of an actor network, and highlighting the way food 
value chains are organised. That said, two types of drawbacks can be identified. The 
first is that such studies primarily highlight issues of bargaining power balance in 
relation to the capacity of absorbing shocks or adapt to diverse vagaries, and not 
strictly speaking, as an economic factor of performance. The second is that the global 
system underpinning the sustainability and resilience of food value chains is poorly 
questioned. There is a need to develop new approaches and/or new conceptual 
frameworks in order to better address the issue of “fairness” in food value chains.  
Some thoughts to an integrated approach 
There are two elements of importance to bear in mind with respect to the 
development of an integrated approach or conceptual framework. The first is that it 
should have the ambition to look at the dynamics of the whole economic system and 
of the actors in it. A second element is that it should look at the capital accumulation 
at every level of food value chains. Particularly, the approach should be able not only 
Theme 5 – Sustainable agrifood systems, value chains and power structures 
13
th
 European IFSA Symposium, 1-5 July 2018, Chania (Greece) 10 
to measure the “fairness” within food value chains but also to identify the 
determinants of it and suggest potential solutions in terms of policies and/or collective 
organisation of actors. The goal to pursue should not be to maximise individuals’ 
utility or to have “perfect markets” but to reach an “acceptable” level of system’s 
resilience and actors’ satisfaction while obtaining an “acceptable fairness” in food 
value chains transactions. In that sense, an approach in terms of resilience could be 
combined with a preference approach together with the Peasant and Marxist 
frameworks. 
Measures can be taken to overcome drawbacks of the current economic system in 
terms of its capitalistic nature. Interesting developments recently happened. For 
instance, the European Institutions recently founded, in October 2017, an agreement 
on the Omnibus Regulation. The Omnibus is a set of propositions to amend the 
financial regulation governing the EU budget and15 other sectorial legal acts (Council 
of the EU, 2017). This proposal includes norms that should impact the functioning of 
the entire food sector. Among others, this agreement includes amendments to the 
Common Market Organisation Regulation with sectorial clauses in terms of equity 
(value share). These measures target all food value chain actors (not only farmers). 
That said, their voluntary nature is still leaving quite some “room of manoeuvre” to 
sizeable and powerful food actors. 
In the same vein, social innovations, including alternative forms of markets, can be 
developed. Social innovations refer to the fields of strategic management, innovation, 
and organisational development (Orsburg and Schmidpeter, 2013), and can be 
defined as “new ideas (products, services, and models) to meet social needs and 
create new social relationships and collaborations” (European Commission, 2013). 
Common to local social innovations are a geographically or socially bound network in 
which collaborative forces are easier to develop and sustain than in the global 
marketplace. Jaeger-Erben et al. (2015) identified more than 20 social innovations 
cases of food production and consumption within a set of 62 social innovations. Two 
examples of social innovations are the development of short food value chains 
allowing farmers to bypass powerful downstream actors, and the implementation of 
local geographic indications. The development of short value chains might also occur 
in parallel of a full integration of transformation activities at farm level, therefore 
eliminating all intermediaries.  
Even if such strategies might be successful, they cannot be expected to substantially 
change the economic system at large. They remain ways of coping with limitations of 
the current system rather than changing it to generate more effectiveness from the 
standpoint of resilience and “fairness” in value chain transactions. The measures 
generally taken so far by the EU have been very much producer oriented, but 
omitting the inclusion of retailers into the agreements. Examples can be found like 
with the so-called “milk package” of which the actions undertaken were mostly 
oriented towards producers’ organisations. Further reflections might be useful on the 
possibility to draw on past market instrument like intervention prices despite their 
known disadvantages. The development of less distorting measures to reduce risks 
linked to price variability can also be interesting; this could be for instance a system 
of “public insurance” with both implicit minimum and maximum prices (levying taxes 
when prices are high and redistribution when prices are low). The further use of 
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contracts to fix in advance prices offered to farmers is another example of a 
potentially relevant reflection that should be carried out.   
Taking a broader perspective it is stressed in the literature that the accumulation of 
capital could be limited by taxing the “stock of capital” owned by individuals and/or 
companies. This proposition was defended by several economists including Maurice 
Allais (1989), a French Economic Nobel Prize winner (laureate). The latter even 
proposed to replace all taxes on revenues, judged economically inefficient because 
based on the resource flow and hampering individual initiatives, by a simple flat tax 
on the stock of capital. Should the accumulation of capital by firms be limited, 
preventing a high concentration, considerable power of food value chain downstream 
actors would be a likely outcome. According to the Marxist approach, this could help 
in getting the pressure off farmers and increase the “fairness” in trade practices. 
Furthermore, the literature highlights a causal relationship between capital 
accumulation and the globalisation movement (Arrighi, 2000). The liberalisation of 
international markets on goods and capitals, in absence of suitable regulation, has 
favoured a concentration of the capital in the hands of a few number of firms, leading 
in turn to bargaining power issues within EU food value chains. A better regulation on 
this rapid development might prevent a too high concentration and accumulation of 
capital by certain food companies. This could include for instance measures to limit 
the size of supermarkets and food companies. A better regulation on the buyout 
business in EU food chains could also be part of a solution package to the issue of 
“fairness”. These elements are quite far beyond the traditional scope of agricultural 
policies and would require to broaden the spectrum of thinking to food value chains 
or even more widened. This perspective, though, might be a more realistic level of 
intervention. 
Conclusion 
This discussion paper aimed at identifying problems in relation to the use of classical 
analytical frameworks, in setting-up EU agricultural policies, regarding the “fairness” 
in food value chains. It emphasises the crucial need of increasing awareness and 
informing policy-makers on potential new policy instruments and tools that could be 
used to address the issue of power imbalance and of inadequate governance 
schemes weakening the position of farmers in food value chains and causing or 
aggravating agricultural crises. 
The integration of new analytical approaches in assessing agri-food policies in the 
field of chain governance is necessary. Thus far, policy developments failed at 
solving structural problems in food value chains. In fact, the measures adopted in the 
past have not addressed the underlying issue of capital accumulation leading to an 
increasing size and concentration of downstream food value chain actors. The 
previous actions undertaken were oriented on voluntary schemes without considering 
much the positions and bargaining power of the different actors along the value 
chain.  
We argue that, beside the possible use of a revised analytical framework, a range of 
measures to restrain the concentration of retailers might be more effective to 
attaining a better “fairness” in actors’ transactions and to conserve a certain vitality in 
rural areas. In our view, relevant issues in relation to the structural position of actors 
in food value chains can be better identified and analysed through the lens of 
alternative analytical frameworks. This discussion paper has shown that there is no 
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perfect conceptual frameworks, either traditional or alternative ones. Nevertheless, 
we support the need to consider a variety of analytical frameworks to adequately 
address complex food policy issues. 
Theme 5 – Sustainable agrifood systems, value chains and power structures 
13
th
 European IFSA Symposium, 1-5 July 2018, Chania (Greece) 13 
References 
Adams, J.S., 1965. Inequity In Social Exchange. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 2, 267–299. 
Allais, Maurice (1989). L'impôt sur le capital et la réforme monétaire. 
Arrighi, G (2000). Globalization, state sovereignty, and the ‘endless’ accumulation of 
capital. The ends of globalization: Bringing society back in, 125-150. 
Bassene, Jean-Baptiste; Quiédeville, Sylvain; Chabrol, Didier; et al. Organisation en 
réseau et durabilité systémique de deux filières alimentaires (riz biologique et petit 
épeautre en France). Actes des 8èmes Journées de recherches en sciences 
sociales, Grenoble, France, 11-12 décembre 2014. INRA, SFER, CIRAD. 
Bernstein, H (1977). Notes on Capital and Peasantry. Review of African Political 
Economy. Taylor and Francis, Ltd. 
Bernstein, H (2014). Food sovereignty via the “peasant way”: a sceptical view. Journal 
of Peasant Studies, Volume 41, 1031-1063. 
Boadway, R.W; and Bruce, N (1984). Welfare economics. New York: B. Blackwell. 
Bukeviciute, L; Dierx, A; Ilzkovitz, F; and Roty, G (2009). Price transmission along the 
food supply chain in the European Union. Paper prepared for presentation at the 
113th EAAE Seminar “A resilient European food industry and food chain in a 
challenging world”, Chania, Crete, Greece, date as in: September 3 - 6, 2009.  
Bukeviciute, L; Dierx, A; and Ilzkovitz, F (2009). The functioning of the food supply chain 
and its effect on food prices in the European Union. European Economy Occasional 
Papers 47.  
Chayanov, A. V (1966). The theory of Peasant Economy. The American Economic 
Association, Homewood. 
Cialdini, R.B., 1993. Influence : science and practice. New York: HarperCollins. 
Council of the EU. 2017. Omnibus regulation: Council adopts new, simplified, 
agricultural rules. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/12/12/omnibus-regulation-council-adopts-new-simplified-agricultural-
rules/pdf.   
Dewbre, J., Antón, J., and Thompson, W., 2001. The Transfer Efficiency and Trade 
Effects of Direct Payments. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Theme 5 – Sustainable agrifood systems, value chains and power structures 
13
th
 European IFSA Symposium, 1-5 July 2018, Chania (Greece) 14 
Dobson, P.W; Waterson, M; and Davies, S.W (2003). The Patterns and Implications of 
Increasing Concentration in European Food Retailing. Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 54(1), 111-125. 
European Commission (2009). Communication on A better functioning food supply 
chain in Europe. European Commission. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0591&from=en.  
European Commission (2009). The evolution of value-added repartition along the 
European food supply chain. European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication16075_en.pdf. 
European Commission (2013). Green Paper on Unfair trading practices in the business-
to-business food and non-food supply chain in Europe. European Commission. 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0037&from=
EN. 
European Commission (2016). CAP expenditure and CAP reform path. European 
Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-post-
2013/graphs/graph2_en.pdf.  
European Parliament (2010). Report on fair revenues for farmers: A better functioning 
food supply chain in Europe. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-
0225&language=EN. 
European Parliament (2011). Report on the farm input supply chain: structure and 
implications. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-
0421&language=EN.  
European Parliament (2013). Report on the food crisis, fraud in the food supply chain 
and the control thereof. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2013-0434+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
European Parliament (2015). Study on unfair trading practices in the business-to-
business food supply chain. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563438/IPOL_STU(2015
)563438_EN.pdf.  
Theme 5 – Sustainable agrifood systems, value chains and power structures 
13
th
 European IFSA Symposium, 1-5 July 2018, Chania (Greece) 15 
European Parliament (2013). Study on Semi-Subsistence Farming – Value and 
Directions of Development. European Parliament. 
file:///C:/Users/miguel.deporras/Desktop/policy/supply%20chain/IPOL-
AGRI_ET(2013)495861_EN.pdf . 
European Parliament (2016). Report on CAP tools to reduce price volatility in 
agricultural markets. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-
0504&language=EN&ring=A8-2016-0339. 
European Parliament (2016). Report on Unfair trading practices in the food supply 
chain. European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-
2016-0173+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
European Parliament (2016). Annual report on EU competition policy. European 
Parliament 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-
2016-0004+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
Eurostat (2011). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5966590/KS-3211-
743-EN.PDF. 
French Observatory on prices and margins formation of food products (2016). Beef 
industry. Presentation to the Meat Market Observatory, EC, 2016, oct. 27th Philippe 
Chalmin, Philippe Boyer. https://observatoire-
prixmarges.franceagrimer.fr/Lists/Liste%20des%20etudes%20autres/Attachments/17
1/2016_10_27_MeatObs_BOVIN.pdf  
IPCC (2007). “In Baede, A.P.M., van Der Lingen, P., Verbruggen, A. (Eds.), Climate 
Change 2007: Appendix to Synthesis Report.” Geneva. 
Jaeger-Erben; Ruchert-John, M.J; and Schafer, M (2015). Sustainable consumption 
through social innovation: a typology of innovation for sustainable consumption 
practices. Journal of Cleaner Production, 108 (1), 784-798. 
Kautsky, K (1988). The Agrarian Question. Zwan Publications, London. 
Kelly, J.S (2014). Arrow impossibility theorems. Academic Press. 
Mahe, L.P. and Roe, T.L., 1996. The Political Economy of Reforming the 1992 CAP 
Reform. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78 (5), 1314. 
Theme 5 – Sustainable agrifood systems, value chains and power structures 
13
th
 European IFSA Symposium, 1-5 July 2018, Chania (Greece) 16 
Sanders, J; Gambelli, D; Lernoud, J; Orsini, S; Padel, S; Stolze, M; Willer, H; and 
Zanoli, R (2016). Distribution of the added value of the organic food chain. 
Braunschweig: Thünen Institute of Farm Economics. European Commission. 
Osburg, T; and Schmidpeter, R (2013). Social innovation. Solutions for a Sustainable 
Future. 
Rabin, M., 1993. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. The 
American Economic Review, 83 (5), 1281–1302. 
Smith, V.L. and Williams, A.W., 2000. Bargaining and market behavior : essays in 
experimental economics. Bargaining and market behavior. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E (1981). Pareto Optimality and Competition. First published: May 1981. Full 
publication history. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00437.x.  
Talamini, E; and Velloso Ferreira, G.M (2010). Merging netchain and social network: 
Introducing the ‘social netchain’ concept as an analytical framework in the 
agribusiness sector. African Journal of Business Management 4:2981-2993. 
Thadakamaila, H.P; Raghavan, U.N; Kumara, R; and Albert, R (2004). Survivability of 
multiagent-based supply networks: a topological perspect. Intelligent Systems, IEEE 
19:24-31. 
Van Der Ploeg, J.D (2008). The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and 
Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization. EARTHSCAN, London 356 pp. 
 
